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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PUEBLO OF SANDLA
Plaintiff,
) Hon. Harold H. Greene

1
)

BRUCE H.BABBITT, in his official
capacity as Secretary of the Interior,
and

MIKE ESPY, in his official capacity
as Secretary of Agriculture
Defendants.
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1
1
1
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FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF GENUINE ISSUES IN RESPONSE TO
NT OF
FACTS

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment; included within its memorandum of
law is a section entitled "Statement of Undisputed Facts," (hmindla"PI. Fact") which sets
forth 41 proposed factual findings. Memomdm at 2-10. Plaintiff has also filed the affidavits
of Rick Hendricks. Ph.D., Elizabah Brandf PLD., and Lamar Panish, Esq., which purport to
suppolt its factual d o n s . PlaintifPs proposed "mdkputedh"
largely focus on the

Pueblo's dhgmanent with the conclusions reached by Solicitor Tarr patainingto an analysis of

the facts uadcrlyingthe 1748 land grcmt to the Pueblo.
Judicial review of agency action is g e n d y limited to the d
470 U.S. 729,743 (1985); 5 U.S.C.

of judicial review lies in the district court, the &ct

' '

'

tivq m r d .

Ehda

4 706. Where the initial level

court is a reviewing corrrt; it does not act as

a fact-finder. Florida470 US. at 744;

-

919 F.2d 439,443 (7th Cir. 1990). Instead, "[tlhe task of the reviewing court is to apply the
appropriate M A [Adminihtive Procedure Act] standard of review, 5 U.S.C.

8 706, to the

agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court."
470 U.S.at 743-744.
In this case, the court ruled on December 10, 1996 that plaintiffs claim is governed by
the APA. Thus,the court must apply 5 U.S.C.

706(2) in order to determine whether Secretary

Hodel's decision not to resurvey, based on the recommendation and analysis of Solicitor Tam,
must be set aside as "arbitmy, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." In such a case summaryjudgment is merely a vehicle to bring thc matter before the
Court.

E~QK& Fruit & Veoeta&z&s'n

v. Brock, 771 F.2d 1455,1459 (1 lth Cir. 1985),

dmicd, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986); C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kanc, 10A Federal Practice and
F'mcedure

3 2733. at 366-67 (1983).

Because the Court need not, and indeed may not, "iind"

underlying facts, there are no material facts essential to the Court's resolution of this action.
Indeed, because an administrative review proceeding does not implicate the possibility of a trial.
if the court were to conclude h m a review of the Adminisfmtive Record that the agency
decision was arbitmy or capricious, the remedy would be to remand the matter to the agency for
reconsideration. Accodngly, to the extent plaintiff seeks to challenge Secretary Hodel's
decision to endom the recommendation of Solicitor Tam, p l a i n w s proposed facts are

mneassq, and review is l i t e d to the dmhkhative record.
Although Federal Defmdants disagree with s e v d of plaintiffs factual contentions,
none of those disputes concern materialhctx conflicting facts, evidence and opinions were

presented to Solicitor Tam,and the issue in this case, assuming arrmendo.that review is
2

permissible under the APA, is simply whether the decisionmaker (the Secretary), based on the
record before him, was arbitrary or capricious.' The existence of a conflict between the parties
concerning the facts or evidence that had been presented does not prevent the court &om granting

summary judgment. It is not the Court's role to determine that an alternate decision was "more"
reasonable than that adopted by the agency.

to Preserve Overtan Park v. Volpe. 40 1

U.S. 402,416 (1971). The issue is strictly whether or not, based on the Adminimtive Record,
the decisionmaker was arbitmy or capricious in reaching its conclusions.
To the extent plaintiff's proposed factual findings concern its theory that impermissible
political pressure was the sole reason for actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior, Federal
Defendants address them accordimgly.

I.

9
9

'

PI. Fact No. 1:"In.1748, the King of Spain formally established the Pueblo of Sandia. A
royal gcmt document was prepared. The 1748 grant (original and as translated) is appended as
Exh. C and D to J

s bAffidavit."

B m :Without waiving the objections noted above. Federal Defendants agree with the

Plaintiff goes outside the Ad ' ' ' five Record by f i l i i &davits signed by Dr. Hendricks
and Dr. Brandt Federal D e f h t s object to the introduction of such affidavits in this APA
record review case. Moreover, and in the alternative, these affidavits merely repeat the evidence
which plaintiff had submitted to -and which was considered by Solicitor Tarr. See also
FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSSMOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT at 22-25. In the further alternative, and without waiving that
objection, Federal Defendants submit the Affidavit of Stanley Hordes PkD.. to counter
plaintiffs aflidavits. & Exhibit "F" attached hereto.

-

proposed finding.

PI. Fact-No.2: "The 1748 royal grant,by its express terms, includes all of the claim area
because it sets the eastem boundary of the Pueblo's land as the "Sierra Madre called Sandia"

-

that is, the "main ridge" of Sandia Peak, the most prominent land feature in the entire area.

m:
Without waiving the objections noted above, Federal Defendants disagree.
Solicitor Tam concluded, after studying the parties' experts reports and evidence, that the
reference in the grant to the "Sierra Madrecalled Sandia" was not intended to be a reference to a

boundary, but as a directional feature. Federal Defendants' Proposed Uncontroverted Facts
("Def. Fact") No. 25. Secretary Hodel was not arbitmry or capricious in relying on Solicitor

Tar's discussion, analysis and conclusion:

The logical inference &om a review of the entire document is that the mountains
mentioned in the third sentence are not themselves the eastern boundary.
Gcmmatically, the sentence itself suggests a parallel construction was intended
for the last clause. It would certainly not be uncommon to omit the word "facing"
in the last of the three parallel clauses. More importantly, this third sentence of
the quoted material from the Act of Possession is not seeking to describe the
boundaries. but rather to memorialize the settine of monuments. One would
expect tha!.if a departme from this approach in
first part of the sentence were
intended in the third clause, a c l a m expression of an intent to call to a natural
feature as.a boundary would have been provided. Significantly, the sentence is
not even an exhaustive rcfmnce to the boundaries. it makes no refto the
western boundary, which is clcarly stated earlier in the Act of Possession to be a
natural feature, the Rio Grande River.

thc

,

In the context of the entire document, the sentence provides for the placqnent of
monuments in each of the m e a d directions, 1.48 leagues to the north and south and 1
league to the east i h e western boundary, b e i i a natural feature, needed no reference
monument Likewise, if the Sandia Mountains w,ere the ostrm boundary. no manmade
monuments would be ncccssary, as cvidmced from the faa Bustamante did not order the

'

natural west boundary, the Rio Grande, be monurnented. The clear inference,then, is that
the reference to the east in the third sentence was not to a natural boundary, but to the
direction for meas&ement of the 1 league upon which manmade monuments w m to be
established, because there was no natural feature to cite as the boundary.
Thus, the co-ction
advanced by the Pueblo would require us to view the language of
the document as internally inconsistent and to ignore the ranbinder of the key documents.
Specifically, we would have to ignore: (1) several references to the intent to establish a
formal Pueblo. (2) reference to the leagues for a formal Pueblo actually having been
measured, and (3) references to the careful adjustment or "netting out" of distances from
the church to the western, northern, and southern boundaries.
Furthermore, one would have expected that if Bustamante had intended to grant the land
between the river and the foothill of the mountains, the cumnt boundary, a total distance
of about 2.2 leagues, provided by the current patent, he would have clcarfy announced
that intention from the outset, and simply measured 1 league to each of the north and
south dinxtions. That would have.rcsultcd in an acreage very close to that of a formal
pueblo, and would not have required consultation with and effect to the neighbors on the
north and south. The Pueblo, argues though, for an even less plausible position, that the
intent was to grant to the crest of the mountains, some 2.6 leagues from the church and
some 3.1 leagues h m the river.

Def. Fact No. 26.
The Secretary was also not arbitrary or capricious in concluding that the term, "Sierra
Madre called Sandia" does not banslate to the "main ridge." Def. Fact No. 21. Federal
Defendants object to the plaintiffs submission and consideration of the affidavit of Dr.
Hcndricks because review is liited to the judicial record. In the altcma!ive, Feded Defendants
submit the Afiidavit of Stanley Hordes to refute plainWs affidavit

h AiTidavit of Stanley

Hordes, PhD. 18-1 1 (Exhibit "Fattached hereto).
Federal Defendants agree that the main range of the Sandia Mouutains is a prominent

land feature in the area, but disagne that it is necessarily the "most prominent." .The low and
high points of the main range, in the vicinity of the claimed area, arc 9,800' and 10.678'. and the
low and high points of the mountain range to the west of the main ridge, called the "foothills" by

plaintiff, range fiom 6,088' to 8,201'. Def. Fact No.24. &Exhibit "A" attached hereto (United
State3 Forest Service Map): Depending on the vantage point, the "foothills" can obscure the
"main ridge," and can therefore also be considered a "prominent feature" in the area. & Ad.

Rec. at 00818; 001592-001612; 000809.

PI. Fact No. 2 "When New Mexico was incorporated as a territory of the United States in
1848, the Treaty of Guadalupc-Hidalgo ntified all land grants which had been made by the
' Spanish sovereigns.

I&'

m:The proposed finding concerns a matter of law rather than fact Nevertheless,
(and without waiving the objections noted above) Federal Defendants agree that the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo ratified all valid land grants that had been made by the Spanish sovereigns.

PI. Fact No. 4: "On December 22. 1858, pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
Congress confirmed the Pueblo's 1748 grant, and commissioned a survey to record the
boundaries of the tract Statutes at Large, X [sic]. 374 (1858).

S
e
e17.7."

BEELY: The proposed finding concerns a matter of law rather than fact Nevertheless.
(and without waiving the objections noted above) FedVal Defendants agree that,pwsuant to 11
Stat. 374, Congress implemented the Tresty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, confirmed the validity of the

Pueblo's 1748 grant, and commissioned a s w e y to ascertain and record the bouadaries for the
subsequent issuance of a patent

EL Fact W "In confirming the Spaukh royal grant, Congress adopted the same grant
6

language as stated in the official "Whiting" translation and set the eastern boundary of the
~ueblo'sland as the "main &dgecalled Sandia. .. . See Ex. Doc. No. 36,34th Cong. 2d, Ex. E
to Headricks Affidavit 7."

BEEL1L:The proposed finding concerns a matter of law rather than fact. Federal
Defendants agree that Congress confirmed the validity of the land grant made to the Pueblo of
Sandia, but disagree with plaintiffs legal conclusion that "Congress enacted the same grant
language as stated in the official 'Whiting' tramlation" as the boundary of the grant, and disagree
with the legal conclusion that Congress "set the eastern boundary of the Pueblo's land as 'the

main ridge called Sandia'." The boundary was determined only after the validity of the grant
was confirmed and through subsequent survey and proceedings. 11 Stat. 374.

Federal Defendants object to the proposed factual finding and consideration of the &davit
of Rick Hendricks. Ph.D.,'because review in this case is limited to the Admini-tive

Record. In

the further a l t e d v e , see Aadavit of Stanley Hordes. PhD., 111 (Exhibit "F" attached hereto)
which refutes the Hendricks affidavit.

a.Fact No. "Following Congress'explicit directive, the Surveyor General instructed his
staff to reconcile the surveys with the documentary evidence of land boundaries.

m

Hendricks

q 8."
BEELY: Without waiving the objections noted above, Federal Defendants disagree. The

d o n s &om the Surveyor General to his staffwere discussed at length in Solicitor Tarr's
Opion. Secretary Hodel was not arbiimy or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's analysis,
and on the Solicitor's conclusion, that the h c t i o n s were complied with Def. Fact. No. 10,
7

11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19.

&&Q

AflFidavit of Stanley Hordes, Ph.D.

a 12 (Exhibit "F" attached

hereio).

PI. Fact No. 7: "John Garretson, the original surveyor, received these instructions, directing
that the boundaries were to confirm the "original grant files" and incorporate all natural markers.

Ld. and Ex. F to HendricksAf idavit 8."

w:Without waiving the objections noted above, Federal Defendants disagree.

The

instructions from the Surveyor General to his staff were discussed at length in Solicitor Tarr's
Opion, and Secretary Hodel was not arbitmy or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's
analysis, the Solicitor's conclusion that the.imtmctions were complied with. Def. Fact. No. 10,
11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19.
Federal Defendants object to the plaintiffs submission and consideraiion of the affidavit of

Dr. Hadricks because review is l i t e d to the judicial record. In the alternative, Federal
Defendants submit the Affidavit of Stanley Hordes to refute plaintiffs affidavit. &Affidavit of
Stanley Hordes, PbD. Af idavit 12, 13 (Exhibit "F" attached hereto).

PI. Fact

"These hstmctions, however, were not followed by Reuben Clements -the

man who substituted for Garretson and eventually surveyed the boundaries of the Sandia grant in
November 1859. Id"

BEELY:

waiving the objections noted above, F e d d Defendants dissgrcc. The

mhuctions from the Surveyor Gcncral to his staffwere discussed at length in Solicitor Tarr's
O p i o n , and Secretary Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's
discussion, analysis and concfusion that the instructions were complied with. Def. Fact No. 10,
8

11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19.
Federal Defendants object to the plaintiffs submission and consideration of the affidavit of

Dr. Hendricks 6ecause review is limited to the judicial record. In the alternative, Federal
Defendants submit the affidavit of Stanley Hordes to refute plaintiffs affidavit. &Affidavit of
Stanley Hordes, Ph.D. 7 13 (Exhibit "F" attached hereto).

PI. Fact No. 9: "[l] As stated above, the eastern boundary of the Pueblo is described in the
1748 Spanish royal grant as the 'Sierra Madre called Sandia'

Ld. 79. [2] Most importantly. the

Whiting trauslation incorporated by the 1858 congressional confirmation sets forth the eastem
boundary of the grant as the 'mainridge called Sandia'

Ld. [3] Yet Clements surveyed the

eastern boundary of the grant as the foothills of the mountain rather than its 'main ridge.'

Id."

m:
The propoked factual finding summarizes the plaintiffs earlier faehral
contentions, and Federal Defendants incorporate their objections and nsponscs hcrcin by
referma. Without waiving any of the objections noted above, Federal Defendants disagree
with the firstsentmce, because it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Solicitor to have
concluded that the refcrcna to the "Siena Madre called Sandia" was not a reference to a

boundary but was,insttad, a directional feature. Federal Defendants disagree with the second
sentence because Congress did not ool$mr the bormdary; it confirmed the validity of the original

Spanish land grant Federal Defcndauts dkgrce with the third sentence in its charactaization of

the first ridge as ''foothills" but ~ ~ I E Cthat Clements surveyed the boundary at that location.

P
I
.
"For most of this century, as in centuries past, the Pueblo used the area

.

9

now in question as its own. Some conflicts arose in the 1930s and 40s. However, these did not
begin to significantly interfere with the Pueblo's religious and ceremonial use of the area until the
1970s, when conflicts became exacerbated, leaving the Pueblo no alternative but to make a
formal claim. Afidavit of L. Lamar P&

'

7 2; see also Affidavit of Elizabeth A. Brandt, Ph.d

fl3-5."

REPLY: Without waiving the objections noted above, Federal Defendants disagree.
Secretary Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis
and conclusion that then was substantial evidence of federal control and ownership of the claim

area throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and actions by state and federal entities
evidencing that this area was not within the plaintiffs land grant. & Def. Fact No. 11,12,27.
Furthermore. Federal Defendants disagree with the proposed factual iinding to the extent it
suggests that the plaintiffs actions wen timely. For the reasons set forth in Federal Defendants'
motion to dismiss, the gravamen of this suit is to quiet title and is barred by the statute of
litations. In the alternative, plaintiff failed to timely avail itself of the exclusive remedy it had

b e m afforded under the Indian Claims Commission Act Plainriffceaainly knew of its claim as
in 1977, as evidenced by a letter sent by Lamar Parrish, its attorney, to the w e n t of the
Interior on October 31.1977. stating: "[The Sandia Pueblo Council] desire to look into the
possibility of claiming Sandia Mountain to the top of the ridgeline. They have asked you to
begin initial inquiries into this, including research into whether this area was the subject of a
claim before the Indian Claims Commission in the 1950's." &Exhibit "G"attached hereto.

Becausejudicial review is t i t e d to the Adminishative Record, Federal Defendants object
to the plaintiffs submission of the aflidavit of Dr. Brandt, even though it contains the same
10

-

information that was included in the reports which were submitted to Solicitor Tarr. Federal
Defendants also object to consideration of the affidavit of Lamar Parrish because it is not averred
that the factual contentions are based on his personal knowledge.

PI. Fact No. I 1:"The Pueblo then filed its claim for a survey correction by the Pueblo to the
Secretary of the Interior through the Department's Office of Trust Responsibility.

Id. 7 3."

B m :Federal Defendants agree that the Pueblo requested the Department of the Interior
to resurvey.

PI. Fact No. 12: "In 1983, that office issued a memorandum endorsing the Pueblo's claim.
Ex. A to.-

. ,.

BEELY: The mem6randum (Ad. Rec. 000181-000184) speaks for itself. The
memorandum sets forth a summary of a report prepared by Ward Alan M i e , and concludes,
merely, that that office "would be willing to provide additional support to the Pueblo in their
efforts to obtain a resolution to this issue." Fedcml Defendants disagree with the materiality of
this contention because d e w in this case is limited to whether Serrctary Hodel

-not an

-was arbitrary or capricious in deciding not to order a

Assistant Secretary or other subordinate

nsrwey based on the analysis and recommendation provided by Solicitor Tarr.

EL Fact U.
'"I%
at
-the
, request of the Departmen< the Pueblo p v i d e d
additional information in the form of expert historical and slweying reports further
dcmodmthg its clear right to the claim area. A number of these reports were authored by the
11

late Dr. Myra Ellen Jenkins, then state historian for New Mexico, who was far and away the most
respected authority in the nation on Pueblo history. Dr. Jenkins' analysis consistently supported
Sandia's claim. Eanisb Affidavit 7 4."

BEELY:Federal Defendants agree that the Pueblo "provided additional information in the
form of expert historical and surveying reports," and that in the Pueblo's view those submissions
supported its claim, but disagrce with the contention to the extent plaintiff claims that it
demonstrated its "clear right to the claim area." Federal Defendants also disagree with plaintiffs
subjective opinion concerning Dr. Jenkins' qualifications. Federal Defendants disagree with the
materiality of the contentions that Dr. Jenkins' ana1ysis'"consistently supported the Pueblo's
claim," and that the Pueblo has a "clear right" to the claim area, because review in this case is
limited to whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's
discussion, analysis and Gnclusion that the claimed aea was not intended to be included within
the original Spanish land grant of a formal pueblo. The Tarr Opinion clearly considered the
views of Dr. Jenkins, along with the views and evidence introduced by othcrintmsted parties.

P
I
.
"No. 1986, aftc~reviewing these reports, then Assistant SccrcWy of the
Interior Ross Swimmer endorsed the Pueblo's request for a survey correction and sent it on to the
Solicitor's Office for the necessay legal work to wmct the erroneous survey.

U.15."

BEELY: Federal Defendmts disagree, although on a point that is immaterial. The decision
whether to order a nswey rests with the S c a c t a of
~ ~the Interior and not the Assistant
Scmchy-Indian Affairs. Accordingly it is immaterial whether a subordinate "endorsedn the
Pueblo's request Fwthamorc, Fedual Defendants disagree with the mntmklity ofthis
12

-

contention because review in this case is limited to the Administrative Record, and whether
Secktary Hodel was arbit&

or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and

conclusion thatthe claimed area was not intended by the Spanish to have been included within
the formal pueblo granted to the Pueblo of Sandia.
Federal Defendants also object to consideration of the affidavit of Lamar Panish because it
is not averred that the factual contentions are based on his personal knowledge.

PI. Fact NO. 15: "In April 1987, Timothy Vollmann, then Associate Solicitor for Indian
Affairs, completed a fonnai opinion concerning Sandia's claim. Associate Solicitor Vollmann

-

the responsible authority within the Department on Indian legal issues - concluded 'that the
patent w e d on the Clements survey] does not comctly reflect the boundary provided for by the
1748 Spanish grant, nor by the report of the Surveyor-General of New Mexico which was
couhned by Congress on December 22. 1858. Thus,it is our opinion, that the Pueblo has
presented a valid claim.'

.. f
ODiniono
Affairs (Ex. B to

Affidavit'l at 1-2."
REPLY: F e d d D e f b t s disagree. As shown at the top, Mr. Vollmanu's memorandum
was clearly marked "DRAFT." Accordingly, it was neither "formal" nor "complete," and was

not the Dqmtmcnt of the Interior's final position. &also Def. Fact No. 5,6. Furthermore, Mr.
Vollmann was not "the responsible authority within the Dqmtment on Indian legal issues"; that
authority rests with the Solicitor and ultimately with the Secretary of the Interior. Federal
Defendants' dkgremcnt with plaintiffs statement does not concern a material issue because
the decision conccming whether to order a resurvey nsts with the Secrcbxy of the Interior, upon
13

the advice of the Solicitor. Furthermore, review in this case is limited to the Administrative
Record, and whether Semiary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's
discussion, analysis and conclusion that the intent of the original Spanish land grant was to
convey a "formal pueblo," and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the Sandia
Mountains. After consideration of all the evidence and arguments presented by the parties after
the Vollmann draft had been circulated, Solicitor Tarr disagreed with Mr. Vollmann's draft
analysis and opinions. Id. Semtary Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor
Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion.

PI. Fact No.16: "Associate Solicitor Vollmann supported his analysis with a history of the
rationale behind the Spanish royal grant His opinion also emphasized Congress' express intent
to follow the Spanish land grant, as well as the explicit order of the Surveyor-General that the

eastern boundary of the Sandia patent should reflect the meander line of the Sandia Mountains.

Eanish Affidavit 17 and Ex. B."
BEELY: Federal Defendants disagree. Mr. Vollmann's report was mmly aUDRAFT."
AccodngIy, it was neither "formaln nor "complete." and was not the department's final

position. Sss also Def. Fact No. 5.6. Flathennore, the o r d m and hshuctions of the Surveyor

General with rapedto the sclrvying arsd patenting of the land wae the subject of Solicitor's
subsequent investigation. Seadary Hodel was not arbiirary or capricious in relying on Solicitor

Tarr's discussion,analysis and conclusion on this matter. Sr& reply to Plaintiffs Reposed

F i g s Nos. 5-9,

Furthermore, h e w in this case is Iiited to whaha Secretary Hodel

was arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion,analysis and conclusion that

.

the intent of the original Spanish land grant was to convey a "formal pueblo" which did not
include the claimed area. h e r consideration of all the evidence presented by the parties after
the Vollmann draft had been circulated and reviewed, Solicitor Tan disagreed with Mr.
Vollmann's draft analysis and opinions.

Id

PI. Fact No.17: "The Associate Solicitor concluded that the Clements survey had followed
the mere foothills rather than "the main ridge" as stated in all of the grant documents. Mr.
Vollmann further relied upon the finding of the Division of Cadastral Survey of the Bureau of
Land Management that this approach was.err0neou.s. Id."

REPLY: Federal Defendants disagree. Mr. Vollmann's memorandum was merely a
"DRAFT." Accordingly, it was neither "formal" nor "complete," and was not the d m e n t ' s

final position. &g also Def. Fact No. 5,6. Furthermore, the actions taken by Clements were the
subject of Solicitor's subsequent analysis. Secretary Hodel was not arbitmy or capricious in
relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the intended boundary of the

Spanish grant, as surveyed by Clements, did not extend to the main ridge of the Sandia
Mountains. &reply to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings No. 5-9,

Furthermore, the

r e f m to the "main ridge" only appead in an alternative translation; it did not appear in "all
of the grant dounncnts."

q l y to Plaintiff's Roposed

No. 21, i&.

Fwthermore. review in this case is limited to whether Scmctary Hodel was &

i

or

capricious in relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion thattbe intent of the

original Spanish land grant was to convey a "fonnal pueblo" which did not include the claimed
area

Atk consideration of all the evidence pmcnted by the parties after the Vollmann draft-

.

15

.

had been circulated and reviewed, Solicitor Tarr disagreed with Mr. Vollmann's draft analysis
and opinions. &

PI. Fact No. 18: "Associate Solicitor Vollmann also reviewed the duty of the Secretary of
the Interior to correct prior errors in such land surveys. His opinion discussed the wellestablished law demonsmiting that 'the contirmation by Congress constituted an absolute and
unconditional recognition of the Pueblo's title to all of the land described in the grant.' Ex. B to
Parrish Affidavit at 7."

m:
Federal Defendants disagree. AAer coniideration of all the evidence, Solicitor
Tarr disagreed with the opinions expressed by Mr. Vollmann in his dmft memorandum, and the
Solicitor was not arbitrary or capricious in reaching his conclusions. Federal Defendants agree
that Congress confirmed the validity of the Pueblo's title to all of the land described in the
Spanish land grant. Secretary Hodel, however, was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on
Solicitor Tan's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the
Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo, and that its boundary was not intended to extend to the main
ridge of the Sandia Mountains.

P
I
.
Ybfr. Vollmann's opinion then turned to the intervening history of the area,
noting that any subsequent actions by the government could not nullify this unconditional grant:

The actions taken subsequent to the codinnation (i.e., the s w e y and issuance of the patent)
were mcrcly ministerial, and could not legally alter the boundaries of the Pueblo established by

the grant. Themfore, the meander line shown on the plat map and reflected in the patent,
16

. ..

does not constitute the operative legal description of the eastern boundary of the Pueblo.' Ex. B
to

at 7-8."

BEELY:Federal Defendants disagree. After consideration of all the evidence and
arguments, Solicitor Tarr disagreed with the opinions expressed by Mr. Vollmann in his draft
memorandum. Federal Defendants agree that Congress confirmed the validity of the pueblo's
land grani and that its boundaries were subsequently delimited by survey and patent. Secretary
Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tart's discussion, analysis and
conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo, and that
its boundary was not intended to extend.tothe main ridge of the Sandia Mountains.

PI. Fact No.20: "Associi Solicitor Vollmann buttressed his conclusion that Sandia was
entitled to the claim area 'kith prior judicial and administrativedeterminations involving similar
land claims. He described the d i g s concerning adjacmt grants which had construed grant
documents similarly describing its boundary 'on the east side of the Sandia Mountains.' As the

Associate Solicitor noted, the Court of Rivate LBnd Claims in one of those cases had dctcmhed
that 'the grant could only have meant that the claimar~tswere entitled to all of the land to the

crest of the Sandia Mountains.'

Id.at 8-9."

BEELY:FaiualDefk!ndantsdisagree. ~eviewinthiseaseisliitedtowhetherSeaetary
Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tam's discussion, analysis and
conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant a formal pueblo to the Pueblo of Sandia, and that
its location did not extend to the crest of the Sandia Mountains. Furthermore, as observed by
Solicitor Tam, the claim by the Pueblo of Sandia was unique because, d i k e other pueblos, it
17
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possessed the original grant documents. See Federal Defendants' Proposed. Fact NO. 7. After
con~idktionof all the evidence, Solicitor Tarr disagreed with the opinions expressed by Mr.
Vollmann in his draft memorandum. Secretary Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying
on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion.

PI. Fact No. 21:"Associate Solicitor Vollmann considered the scope of the Secretary of the
Interior's authority to order a corrected survey. He noted that 'the courts have long held that the
Secretary has broad authority to make detamimtions concerning the disposition of public lands.'
Id. at 9."

.

m:The proposed finding con-

an issue of law rather than fact, and is immaterial

to the issue before the court: whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on
Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the
Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo that did not extend to the crest of the Sandia Mountains.

PI. Fact N0.22.: 'The Associate Solicitor relied upon the almost identical claim and

-

remedy in the case of Isleta Pueblo to demoostrate how this authority must be used in this case:
'Such Secretarial authority was exercised in 1918 in response to a petition by the Pueblo of

..

Islaa, whose the -the

the

lhe

Isleta claim involved an allegation that an area four to six miles wide had been omitted h r n the
patent The graot to the Pueblo of Isleta, which was also confirmed by the Act of December 22,

1858,ll Stat. 374, described the eastern boundary as the 'backbone1of the S d a Mountains.

The

however- as

a

dlsvute. the Secretarv det

S e r v ~ e .In

of the S&
e of a su~o-~atent

'

ed that W

..

t d1d d u d e all of thg

Mountains. and t h m a t e n t was mncorrect. A new survev and
f

a excluded lands was ordered. The Pueblo agreed to

waive any claims to existing holdings of non-Indians.' Id. at 10, citing Interior Document D29675, July 18, 1918" (Emphasis added by plaintiff).

m:Federal Defendants disagree. After consideration of all the evidence, Solicitor Tam
disagreed with the opinions expressed by Mr. Vollmann in his draft memorandum, and the Solicitor
was not arbitmy or capricious in his analysis and distinguishing of the facts concerning the Isleta

grant.

Def. Fact No. lO,26,27. Secretary Hodel was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on

Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion.

PI. Fact No.:"The Associate Solicitor concluded that there was additional statutory
authority for the Secretary to comct such patents under Section 3 16 of the Federal Land Policy
Management Act.

Id. at 11. That act provides that: The Secretary may correct patents or documents

of conveyance issued pursuant to section 1718 of this title or to other acts relating to the disposal of
public lands where necessary to eliminate errors. In addition, the Secretary may make c o d o n s
of errors in any documents of conveyance which have heretofore bem issued by the federal
government to dispose of public lands. ' 43 U.S. C. 5 1746."

REPLY: The proposed finding also concerns an issue of law rather than fact, and is
immaterial to the issue before the court: w h a h r Secretary Hodel was arbitmy or capricious in
relying on Solicitor T&S discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to
19

the Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo, and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the
Sandia'Mountains.

-0.24:

"The Associate Solicitor carefully reviewed any possible impediments to

such an administrative correction and concluded that none was valid. Ex. B to brxish Affidavit at
12-13.

BEFLY: The proposed finding also concerns an issue of law rather than fact, and is
immaterial to the issue before the court: whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in
relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to
the Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo and that it wai not intended to extend to the crest of the
Sandia Mountains.

EL Fact NO.25; "Of particular importance, the Associite Solicitor noted that '[tlhere

is no

statutory limitation on when a petition for correction of an error must be presented for
administrative action."

Id at 12. The Associate Solicitor then concluded that, '[tlhe

Pueblo of

Sandia has prescd~teda meritorious claim and the matte^ is within the scope of the Secretary's
authotity to effeci an v-e

remedy, namely to revise erroneous language of the 1864

patmt and to &kta new sumy in accordance with the revised language.'

REPLY:The proposed finding concerns an issue of law h

Id. at 13."

athan faa, and is immaterial to

the issue before the court: whether Secretary Hodel was arbitmy or capricious m relying on

.

Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the Pueblo
of Sandia a formal pueblo and that it was not intended to extend to the mst of the Sandia
20
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Mountains.

PI. Fact No. 26: "[I] Shortly after he received this opinion, then Interior Solicitor Ralph Tarr
sent it to the General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture to obtain any comments. [2] Mr.

Tarr indicated that he intended to issue the opinion within a few days. [3] He further requested that
Agriculture maintain the matter in confidence until the papenvork was completed. Parrish Affidavit

115."

BEEX: Federal Defendants admit the first sentence. Federal Defendants deny the second
sentence, which is not supported by plaintiff with admissible evidence. Solicitor Tarr sent a copy of
the draft opinion to Christopher Hicks, General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture on April
8, 1987. The Solicitor expressed his desire to move expeditiously and, possibly, finalize the
opinion by April 16, although he requested the Dcpariment of Agriculture to prtsent "any additional
facts or legal authorities you feel we should consider before that date in issuing the opinion." Ad.
Rcc. at 000771. On April 15,1987, Mr. Hicks advised Solicitor Tarr that he had received the dmft
opinion on April 14.1987, and that it had bem that department's earlier undmtadhg that it

'%would have an adequate opportunity to review the facts and law on the matter before [the
Solicitor's office] took a formal positionn Ad. Rec. at 000784. On A p d 20. 1987, Solicitor Tarr
agreed to allow the Dqmlmat of Agriculture additional time to submit its review of the draft

opinion. Ad. Rec. at 000784B. On June 4, 1987, the Dqartmcnt of Agriculture provided Solicitor

Tarr with its review of the Vollrnann dmft opinion (see Ad. Rec. at 000804-000819), noting that
Agriculture's "opinion reaches conclusions that conilict with those reached in your draft opinion,"
21

.

and that the Vollmann opinion " d m not appear to address all essential law and facts relwant to this
miner." Ad. Rec. at 000804. Mr. Hicks observed the short time that his Department had to review
the draft opinion; and expressed the desire to "discuss this matter further before [Solicitor Tarr]
takers] final action." Federal Defendants admit that when the draft opinion was sent to the Office of
General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture for consideration by that agency, Solicitor Tarr
asked the~eneralCounsel to "hold this draft close and distribute it only inside of your office and
only to the extent necessary to review it adequately."
Inasmuch as the issue before the court is whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious
in relying on Solicitor Tarr's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant
to the Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the
Sandia Mountains, this disagreement with plaintiff does not concern a matnial issue.

PI. Fact No. "Breaking that promise, Agriculture officials in the Albuquerque area
released the Vollmann opinion together with a press package which asserted that the Pueblo
intended to oust the few private landowners living in the claim area of their title.

u. 7.16."

BEELy: Fedcral Defendants dkagrcc. Rcview m this case is limited to the Admkhmive

Record, and whetha Secretary Hodel ivas arbitmy or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tan's
discussion, analysis ahd wnclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the Pueblo of Sandia a
f o d pueblo and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the Sandia Mountains. After
consideration of all the evidence, Solicitor Tan disagreed with the opinions expressed by Mr.
Vollmacm in his draft memorandum. Federal D e f h h t s deny this contention, which is not

supported by plaintiff with admissible evidence. The disagreement with respect to this contc@ion
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does not concern a material fact.

PI.:

'"11 That assertion by Agriculture was not only false but also contrary to the

express position of the Pueblo which would have respected and, in fact, cleared the title of the
private landowners. [2] Nevertheless, this tactic resulted in some opposition to the proposed
correction and political pressure on Mr. Tam to reverse Mr. Vollrnann's opinion.

u."

BEELY:The proposed factual findings are immaterial because the issue in this case is
whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on Solicitor Tam's discussion,
analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant a formal pueblo to the Pueblo of Sandia
and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the Sandia Mountains. Without waiving this
objection, and with respect to the first sentence. Federal Defendants assert that the issue of whether
title would be "cleared" by actions or decisions made by the plaintiff presents a legal rather than a
factual isme. The claim in the second sentence that "political pressure" was placed on Solicitor
Tam, la alone impermissible or illegal "political pressure," is not supported by plaintiff with
admissible evidence. Federal Defendants admit that the Department of the Interior nceived the
opinions and evidmcc h m several individuals who opposed resurvey; their views, along with
those of the plaintiff and its supporters, .ire included in the Admbkhtive Rccord.

PI.:
"29:December 9,1988, Mr.Tan tmmitted an opinion rmrsing the prior
opinion of Associ Solicitor Vollmann, as well the conclusions of Assistant Saxctay Swimmer
and every other Interior official who had considered this issue. Ex. C to -Affidavitn

BEELY:The proposed faaual findings are immatuial because the issue in this case is limited
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to the Administrative Record, and whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in relying on
Solicitor Tan's discussioi analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to the Pueblo
of Sandia a formal pueblo and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the Sandia
Mountains. Without waiving those objections, Federal Defendants admit that Solicitor Tarr issued
the official position of the Ofice of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior on December 9,
1988, and 'that it was endorsed by the Secretary on December 13,1988. Ad. Rec. at 001691.
Federal Defendants deny the allegation to the extent it implies that Mr. Vollmann's draft opinion
had been earlier adopted by the Secretary of the Interior (or by the Solicitor) and was thus being

"reversed" by Solicitor Tan. Federal Defendants deny the allegation that Mr. Tarr's Opinion
conflicted with "every other Interior official who had considered this issue," which, in any event, is

immaterial since the issue is whether the Secretary was arbitrary or capricious in relying on
Solicitor Tarr's analysis. 'Plaintiffs counsel was so advised on December 14,1988, in a letter fium
Solicitor Tan to Peter Grossi, Jr., Esq., which e n c l o d the Tan Opinion and states:

.

&g

The opinion concludes that the Pueblo's assation of entitlement to expansion of its
eastern boundm to the crest of the Sandia Mountains is without merit. Senior
department officials were unanimous in expressing to the Secretary their support of this
conclusion. The Secretary has reviewed and concurred in the o~inionand believes that
it would be inappmpriatcb take further action with rspact to the Pueblo's patent. In
reaching this conclusion, the Secretary had the benefit of the parties' oral and written
submissions, directly and through thesenior w e n t offi&ds who were pnsent at
meetings with these parties.
The opinion is the product of an exhaustive review of the law and the facts. This d e w
involved considerable time and energy of countless employees of the Department, including
those at the highest levels.
Exhibit "B" attached hereto.

.

PI.No. 330: "Mr. Tan's opinion was replete with factual and legal errors. Yet even he
r c c o the
~ obligation of the Department of the Interior to c o r n erroneous boundaries. Panish
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m:
Plaintiffs assertion that the T m Opinion contains "factual and legal errors" is so
vague that a response cannot be formulated. Furthermore, the issue is not whether plaintiff agrees
or disagrees with the Solicitor's analysis, but whether Secretary Hodel was arbitrary or capricious in
re1yir.g on Solicitor Tm's discussion, analysis and conclusion that the Spanish intended to grant to

the Pueblo of Sandia a formal pueblo and that it was not intended to extend to the crest of the
Sandia Mountains. The assertion that there is an "obligation. . . to comct erroneous boundaries" is
not a factual contention but one of law.
... -

PI. Fact No. 3 1: "Specifically, Mr. T m found that the Agriculture Department's contention
that thc surveyor enjoyed 'considerable discretion in setting the boundaries of the grant' was
'simply without foundation.' Ex. C to

Affidavit at 14. Rather, as even Mr. Tan recognized,

'the 1858 Act makes it clear that congress intended to grant the Pueblo title to all lands held by the
Pueblo while it was under Spanish dominion.'

u. at 15."

BEELY: Federal Defendants agree.

P
1
.
:
"Having made this critical concession. Mr. Tan then proceeded to engage in
various &rationalizations

m an attempt to argue away the existence of Sandia Peak

-that is.

16 prctcnd that the Clemmts survey was somehow comct in meandering the foothills, when the

Spanish grant, as contirmed by Congress, called for the eastan boundary to be kt at the 'main
ridge' of the mountain.

BEELY:

Afiidavit 119."

Federal Defendants disagra. After considering the e v i b and arguments, .
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Solicitor Tarr concluded that the Clements survey was not erroneous; and that the Spanish intended
to giant to the Pueblo of ~ A d i a formal pueblo that did not extend to the crest of the Sandia
Mountains. Federal Defendants disagree with the contention that Congress '*called for the eastern
boundary to be set at the 'main ridge' of the mountain." See reply to PI. Fact No. 5-9, m.

Pi. Fact N o . "From December 1988 to December 1994, representatives of the Pueblo
attempted to convince the succeeding Secretaries of the Interior, and their appointed representatives,
to reverse the Tarr opinion and to issue the corrected land survep as provided in the Vollmann
opinion. &mi.&Affidavit 7 27."

-

m:
Federal Defendants admit that, h

m 1988 through 1994, plaintiffs representatives

met with officials of the Department of the Interior in an effort to convince them, and ultimately the
Smttary, to reverse S e m k y Hodel's decision which had adopted the Tarr Opiion.

PI. Fact No.:"While Sandia was successful in convincing representatives of the
Department of the Intaior, up to and including the cumnt Solicitor, that Mr. T d s opinion was
erroneous and that Sandia's claim is valid, the Department has not issued a corrected survey.

Id."

m:
Federal Defmdants disagree. Dwing a meetingwith Pueblo representatives in the
fall of 1994, Mr. Leshy conveyed his thoughts on the subjecS noting specificaIly that while some
members of his staff believed the Tarr Opiion may have been wrong on caFain points, he had not
m h e d a conclusion. Mr. Leshy did not tell the Pueblo's gmsmtatives that he intended or
planned to ICVCISC

the Tarr Opinion, or that he would recommend to the Secrrtary that he
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Secretary Hodel's decision not to order a resurvey of the Pueblo's boundaries.

k
e Declaration of

John Leshy 7 9 (~xhibit"E" attached hereto). During none of his discussions with the Pueblo's
representatives did Mr. Leshy state that he was planning to reverse theTarr Opinion, or that he had
reached a conclusion that the Tarr Opinion should be reversed. Declaration of John Leshy 113
(Exhibit "Enattached hereto).
The affidavit of attorney Parrish does not contain admissible evidence to support the
assertion that Solicitor Leshy had been convinced that Solicitor Tarr's decision was erroneous and
that the Pueblo's claim to the disputed area was valid.
. ..

PI. Fact No. 35: "[1]In August 1993, representatives of the Pueblo met with Ms. Ada Deer,
the new Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs. [2] They provided Ms. Deer with detailed documents
demonstrating the Pueblo's right to the claim area and substantial legal analysis demonstrating that

Mr. Tan's opinion was invalid.

u.129."

RlZLX: Federal Defendants agree that in or about August 1993, representatives of the Pueblo
communicated with Ms. Ada Deer, who was then the new Assistant Scerctary for Indian Affhh.
With respect to the second sentence,~;daal
Defendants admit that plaintiff provided documents
but deny the contention to the extent it suggests that the Pueblo presented any evidence that had not

been considmd by Solicitor Tam, or which dernonstmtcd that Secntary Hodel was arbitmy or

capricious in relying on Solicitor Tam's discussion, analysis and conclusion, or that the Tan opinion
was "invalid." Declaration of John Leshy 112 (Exhibit "E" attached herno)

.
-
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PI. Fact No. 36: "Following her review of these materials, Ms. Deer advised the Pueblo
representatives that she believed the Pueblo's claim was valid and that the claim area should be
returned. U."

BEELY:Federal Defendants disagree.

On or about November 2.1993, Ada Deer's office

advised plaintiff's representatives that the Pueblo's request to reconsider Solicitor Tarr's opinion

had been forwarded to Solicitor Leshy for his review.

&g

Exhibit "C"attached hereto. By

memorandum dated November 2. 1993 to_SolicitorLeshy, Ms. Deer requested a review of the Tam
opinion, stating that, "We are certain the Secretary of the Interior desires to fully exercise his trust
responsibility to protect the Pueblo's land intcmts".*Exhibit

.

.

. ..

(Emphasis added).

"D"attached'hmto. The disagreement with respect to this contention does not concern

a material issue, since the authority to decide whether to order a resurvey rests exclusively with the
Secretary.

P
I
.
"At the quest o
then made formalm

f f istant Secntary Deer, qmentatives of the Pueblo

o l l s to Solicitor John

Leshy and members of his staffon a number of

occasions in 1993 and 1994 in an effort to persuade him to issue the survey comctio& WO."
F e d 4 D e f d t s admit the assertion that Solicitor Leshy and his staffmet with
plaintiffs qrescntatiws on a number of occasions in 1993 or 1994, in an effort to persuade him to
recommend to the Secretary that the laad be resuneyed, but deny thatthe Pueblo's communications

with Solicitor Leshy or his staffwere a s a result of a request by Assistant Secretary Deer. The
disagreement with respect io this matter does not concern a material issue since the authority to
decide whether to order a resurvey rests exclusively with the Secretary.

U c t No. 38: "After several months of review, Mr. Leshy and others in the Solicitor's

Office advised the Pueblo that they too had concluded that (a) the Tarr opinion was invalid in its
construction of the relevant statutory authority of the Secretary of the Interior to correct erroneous
land surveys and (b) the Pueblo had presented at least a colorable, and very possibly entirely valid,

u.;'
m:
Federal Defendants disagree.

claim for relief.

During a meeting with Pueblo representatives in the

fall of 1994, Mr. Leshy conveyed his thoughts on the subject., noting specifically that while some
members of his staff believed the Tarr Opinion was wrong concerning the merits of the Pueblo's
claim, he had not reached a conclusion. Declaration of John Leshy q 9 (Exhibit "E"attached
hereto). In the fall of 1994, Mr. Leshy had not completed his review of a l l of the submissions in the
Solicitor's Office file on the Pueblo's claim, and consequently had not reached a conclusion as to
whether or not the Tarr Opinion was cbmct regarding the Pueblo of Sandia's eastan boundary.

Mr. Leshy did not tell the Pueblo's nprcsentatives that he intended or planned to reverse the Tarr
Opinion, or that he would mmmend to the Secretary that he reverse Secretary Hodel's decision

and order a resurvey of the Pueblo's boundaria. Declaration of John Leshy 19 (Exhibit "E"
attached hereto). Sometime shortly before December 8, Mr. Leshy decided not to recommend to
the Secraary that the Tarr Opinion be suspended. Declaration of John Leshy 111. During nqne of
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his discussions with the Pueblo's representatives did Mr. Leshy state that he was planning to reverse
the Tarr Opinion, or that he' had reached a conclusion that the Tarr Opinion should be reversed. Mr.
Leshy also did not authorize any of the attorneys on his staff to make any representations that the

Tarr Opinion would be reversed. Declaration of John Leshy 7 13. Prior to December 8,1994, the
Pueblo had not presented Mr. Leshy with any evidence that had not previously been presented to
Solicitor Tam, and Mr. Leshy was not convinced based on his review of the Tarr Opinion and the
facts that had been presented by the Pueblo, that the Tarr Opinion was clearly erroneous.
Declaration of John Leshy 7 12.

PI. Fact No. 39:"111 On November 30. 1994. representatives of the Pueblo met with Solicitor
Leshy to determine the stitus of his progress on a nexamination and r e v d of Mr. Tan's Opinion.
[2] Solicitor Leshy indicated that he had actively been engaged in a mxamination of Mr. Tan's

opinion; that he continued to believe that Mr. Tan's opinion was invalid in a number of mpccts;
that he was not yet ready to issue a new opinion officially reversing the opinion and granting the
Pueblo the relief it has soughc but that he was planning to withdraw the Tarr opinion prior to

Dccunba 8,1994 so that he could corriplctc the correction process without requiring the Pueblo to

run any risk that its claim would be bamd by any statute of limitations calculated h m the date of
the Tarr opinion

Id. 1 31."

portion of the second sentmce indicating that Solicitor Leshy was then engaged in an active
reexamination of the Tam Opinion. Federal Defendants deny the contentions in the first and second
30

sentences to the extent they imply that Solicitor Leshy had by then reached any conclusion as to the
wiiectness of the Tair opihion, or that the opinion was invalid, or that he had decided to issue a
new.opinion reversing the Tarr opinion, or that he believed that the Pueblo was entitled to the relief
it sought. With respect to the last clause in the second sentence. Federal Defendants deny that
Solicitor Leshy had indicated that he was "planning to withdraw the Tarr opinion prior to December

8, 1994." 'Declaration of John Leshy at fi
9-13 (Exhibit " E attached hereto) .

PI. Fact No. 4Q: "On December 6,1994, however, the Pueblo representatives learned that
Department officials had been advised that one or more elected officials from New Mexico did not
favor the withdrawal of the Tarr opinion or the ultimate correction of the erroneous Clements
survey.

u. 7 32."

BEELY: Federal Defendants are without d c i e n t information to form a belief as to the truth
of the contention concerning when plaintiffs representatives' allegedly learned that "one or more
el&

officials b m New Mexiw did not favor the withdrawal of the Tarr opinion or the ultimate

correction of the [allegedly] erroneous Clements survey." or the sou= of the plaintiffs'
rqn&ntativess

alleged knowledge. Federal Defendants admit receipt by the -ent

of the

Interior of a letter dated November 17,1994, addressedto Solicitor Leshy h m Senetor Domenici,

and a letter dated August 15.1994. addressed to Secretary Babbitt fnnn Representative Bill
Richardson concentkg the matter. One letter supports the Pueblo in its claim, the other disagrees
with the pueblo's claim. The letter ficnn Senator Domenici states:

Dear Solicitor Leshy:

It has come to mv attention that the Sandia Pueblo Indians of New Mexico are once
again asserting their claim to the Forest Service land between their Pueblo and the top
of the Sandia Momtiins. Former Solicitor Ralph Tarr issued an opinion about six years
ago barring further action on this claim.
Many homeowners in Sandia Heights have expressed their concerns to me about the
most recent and surprising effort to overtum the Tarr decision. I have a copy of a letter
to you from Brad L. Hays of Albuquerque, dated October 25, 1994. Mr. Hays purports
to speak for "local political leaders" who feel as he does that "properly handled, the
landowners and the public will accept the decision" to honor the Sandia Pueblo claim. I
am one New Mexico political leader who strongly disagrees with this assessment.
The Brad Hays letter is viewed, not only as incorrect in its assertions of public support,
but also threatening in stating that "forced" litigation will result in clouded titles for
"each and every affected property." He further states that, in the event of litigation, "the
outcome and its effect upon their property would not be guaranteed." .
-

.

I appreciate the complexity of the legal situation, and I am confident that you will
review this claim carefully. It is my hope that we can find some avenue to allow
improved access for the &dia ~ & b l oto their aboriginal areas without h t e n i n g the
stability of cumnt ownership and recreational uses of this land.
I appreciate your atfention to this important matter.
Sincerely yours.
1st

Pete V. Domenici
United States Senator
The letter firom Repmcntative Richardson to Secretary Babbitt states:

Dear Mr. Scctctary:

I am writing to thank you for the courtesies you and your Department have shown to
triM officials of the Pueblo of Sandia with ngard to issues facing their Tribe, including
the am!kr of the Sandia Mountaia As you may d,
they have sought an
..
-ye
c o d o n of the eastern bouadary of their memation to the main ridge
of the Sandia Mountain, thus restoring 9.50dacns of their reservation. Specifically,
they have asked the Solicitor to reconsider the issues and reverse the T m Opinion of
Decrmber 9.1988. which they believe to be ill-founded and politically motivated. on
both issucs, the first relating to Secretarial authority to make administrative adjustments
to boundaries, and the second based on the merits of their claim. The approach the
Tribe has asked the Secretary to take would protect all of the private landownns and -

other rights, including access.
'over the years I ha"e been supportive of the Sandia Pueblo and its various initiatives. I
trust that your office will give the Governor and his ~dminiSt.ationevery consideration
as you review this issue.

Thank you for your continuing cooperation in the important matters facing Indian country.
Sincerely,
Is/

BILL RICHARDSON
Chairman
Subcommittee on Native American Affairs
As further demonstrated in FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM M OPPOSITION

TO PLAMTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND M SUPPORT OF
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT at 10-14, communications between members

of Congress and the Secretary or the Solicitor an not illegal or impermissible, or presumed to be

illegal or impermissible. '

PI. Fact No. 41: "Despite the further pleas of the Pueblo rcpmentatives, the Interior officials
then refused to proceed with the Sandia claim and advised the Pueblo that the Tan opinion would

u."
m:
Plaintiffs contention that it had a "cIaim" constitutes a legal conclusion. Federal

not be withdrawn.

Defendants also Aisspret with this contention to the extent plaintiff implies that the rdusal by
Solicitor Leshy to recommend to Secretary Babbitt that the Hodel decision be reversed d t e d

from political pr*isun. The Pueblo's attorney informed Mr. Leshy that, he would commence a suit
on behalf of the Pueblo if the Tarr Opinion was not reversed by December 8.1994. Declaration of
John Leshy at 1q 10-1 1 (Exhibit "E" attached haeto). Rior to December 8,1994, the Pueblo had
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not presented Mr. Leshy with any evidence that had not previously been prescntcd.to Solicitor Tarr.

Mr. L&hy had a discussionwith Secretary Babbitt just prior to December 8,1994, and informed the
Secretary that he was not convinced based on his review of the Tarr Opinion and the facts that had
been presented by the Pueblo, that the Tam Opinion was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Mr. Leshy
decided not to recommend to the Secretary that the Tarr Opinion be suspended. Declaration of John
Leshy f 12; Mr. Leshy's deliberations over the merits of the Tarr Opinion were not influenced by

any communications with members of Congress. Declaration of John Leshy 11 14.
Dated:

9~2'1,
/Sr7
Respectfully submitted,
Lois Schiffer
Assistant Anomey General

United States Deuartment of ~usc&-"
Environment and Natrnal Resources Division
PO Box 663
Washington, D.C.20044-0663
(202) 305-0237
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Washington, D.C. 20004
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Washington, D.C. 20037-1420
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